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This case was developed as part of the Evaluation Roundtable, an association of 
evaluation professionals working in philanthropy dedicated to developing a community of 
practice and learning for their work.  The development of this case and others has been 
supported financially by the California Endowment, the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, the 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the W. K. Kellogg Foundation, the John S. and James L. 
Knight Foundation, the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, the James Irvine Foundation, 
and the Wallace Foundation.  Teaching of the cases has also been supported by the Evaluation 
Roundtable and Grantmakers for Effective Organizations, as well as philanthropic supporters of 
particular case teaching sessions. 
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 In the fall of 1996, government in the United States embarked on a journey called 
―devolution‖ – shifting powers, responsibilities, and funding from the federal level of 
government to the state level, and sometimes to the local level, for a number of social 
welfare programs, beginning with the cash assistance program for low-income families 
formerly known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), often called 
―welfare.‖  The embarkation event, a law called the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunities Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), was radical, overturning a social safety 
net that had been built over several decades.  And it was politically divisive because the 
shift of authority away from the federal government was accompanied by a shift from an 
open-ended system of income assistance to one with budget limits, time limits for 
receiving cash assistance, and requirements for cash assistance recipients to work.  
Advocates for low-income families worried that many would be left destitute and their 
children consigned to foster care; public policy analysts worried that states, now freer to 
set welfare policies, would begin ―a race to the bottom‖ to reduce benefits and assistance 
to low-income families; the authors of the PRWORA legislation worried that 
Congressional intent would be undermined by liberals in government and in nonprofit 
entities seeking to ―soften‖ the provisions of the law.1 
 
 Looking back in 2002 on such concerns, President William Richardson
2
 of the W. 
K. Kellogg Foundation said, 
 
Even as perhaps the biggest economic boom in history swept the nation, we 
wondered how Temporary Assistance to Needy Families [which replaced AFDC] 
would fare when the economy faltered.  Even as stocks rose to record highs, we 
asked what would happen if lower tax revenues required states to cut 
transportation and childcare supports to the working poor.  Even when some 
financial advisors thought a bear market was unlikely, we questioned how the 






 The W. K. Kellogg Foundation had historically focused on communities and 
community-level issues, and had historically been disinclined to engage public policy 
issues.  The Foundation was also historically reluctant to support research, including 
policy research.  But, as national welfare reform and devolution were being discussed, a 
convergence of events and changes in the Foundation led to an interest in devolution and 
related research. 
 
                                               
1  In addition to cash assistance for low-income families, ―devolved‖ by the 1996 law, the Balanced Budget 
Act of 1997 authorized federally funded health insurance coverage for children that was to be designed and 
managed by states; this program, called the State Children‘s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), became 
another key subject of devolution and of the W. K. Kellogg Foundation‘s Devolution Initiative. 
 
2 William C. Richardson retired as President of the W. K. Kellogg Foundation in December, 2005. 
 
3
  William C. Richardson, ―Devolution: The End of the Beginning‖ (speech to Devolution Initiative 
conference), January 10, 2002, Washington Marriott Hotel, Washington, DC. 
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First, William (Bill) Richardson had been hired as the new foundation president in 
1995.  As a scholar of health care policy, Board Chair of the Kaiser Family Foundation, 
and former President of Johns Hopkins University, he had a longstanding interest in 
public policy.  Richardson also had a three-decade relationship with the Foundation, first 
as a Kellogg Fellow at the University of Chicago in the 1960‘s, then as a member of 
several Foundation task forces, and as a grantee for three projects.  Richardson ―knew 
that community-based work and policy research could be combined‖ at the Foundation.  
He was also specifically interested in devolution because it was big and had implications 
for communities. 
 
Second, several leading national research institutions were shopping proposals to 
funders to gather resources to study the effects of devolution.  Richardson saw these as a 
way to get involved in devolution and public policy if they could be linked with building 
community capacity in terms of policy change.  As he characterized his early idea:  ―Here 
is something important about to happen [devolution]; here are two or three organizations 
coming to us; let‘s see if it can come together.‖ 
 
Third, Richardson had a vision for the Foundation to move it ―from grantmaking 
to changemaking‖ that entailed organizational changes.  He initiated a restructuring of the 
Foundation intended to eliminate independent fiefdoms, increase coordination across 
programs, and increase the impact of the Foundation‘s programs – which ultimately 
provided the form for the Foundation‘s first large, cross-foundation initiative.  In 1996, 
he created a cross-foundation task force to look at what the Foundation might do to 
highlight the devolution-related policy changes for the communities historically of 
interest to the Foundation.  The result was the Devolution Initiative, a seven-year, $56 
million project with 31 grantees and a $3.6 million external evaluation. 
 
 
Initiative and Evaluation: Co-Evolution 
 
 The Devolution Initiative (DI) and its evaluation intentionally unfolded together.  
The devolution policy was seen as extremely complex, but not predictable in 1996, and 
the Foundation wanted an evaluation that would help guide its work on the Initiative. 
 
 The Initiative:  A Focus on Informing Policy 
 
The Foundation staff began the Initiative with an information-focused concept 
that tied together the historic Foundation mission of ―helping people help themselves‖4 
and the emerging policy landscape of devolution.  The staff assumed that actors in state, 
local, and tribal arenas would need information to help them make and influence the 
making of good policy in the circumstances of devolution.  Thus, producing, 
disseminating, and building capacity to effectively use information was at the heart of the 
Foundation‘s Devolution Initiative.  The 31 DI grantees played various roles in its 
                                               
4  The fuller version of the W. K. Kellogg Foundation‘s mission is ―to help people help themselves through 
the practical application of knowledge and resources to improve their quality of life and that of future 
generations.‖ 
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information-based strategy to shape policy.  ―Partners,‖ as the grantees were called, 
included: 
 
 National nonprofit research institutions conducting national research to study the 
effects of devolution on low-income families.  These groups included the Urban 
Institute, the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government at the State 
University of New York-Albany, MDRC, the Hudson Institute, and Johns 
Hopkins University‘s Department of Sociology. 
 
 National policy research organizations tracking and interpreting changes in laws, 
regulations, funding, programs, demographics, and other trends related to 
devolution.  These groups included the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the 
Center for Law and Social Policy, the Center for Community Change, the Center 
for Policy Alternatives, the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, and the National Governors‘ 
Association. 
 
 National advocacy organizations – some with state affiliates – tracking the 
potential effects of devolution on particular populations or existing service 
programs and working to minimize harms and maximize benefits for these 
populations and service programs as states, localities, and tribes made decisions 
about welfare, health care and other social safety net issues.  These groups 
included Families USA, the National Association of Child Advocates (now called 
Voices for America‘s Children), the National Coalition on Health Care, the 
National Congress of American Indians, the Immigrant Welfare Implementation 
Collaborative, and the Children‘s Defense Fund. 
 
  State advocacy groups – some affiliated with national advocacy organizations – 
in Florida, Mississippi, Montana, New York, Washington, and Wisconsin 
working to shape state, local, and tribal social safety net policies. 
 
 
The Foundation staff also saw in devolution new opportunities for citizen 
participation in government; in line with the historic mission, it was assumed that the 
people who would be affected by devolution of social and health care policies should be 
encouraged and empowered to participate in the state, local, tribal, and national decisions 
affecting them, their families, and their communities.  While citizen mobilization and 
coalition building were envisioned as key activities of the Initiative from the outset, it 
was not originally envisioned that the Foundation would fund state-level advocacy 
groups to do this work.  Initially, the assumption was that by funding national advocacy 
organizations and linking them to national research and policy analysis groups, the DI 
would generate policy-oriented activity in 40 states because the national advocacy 
grantees had affiliates or related entities in that many states.   (In the Initiative, the 
Foundation was notably not promoting any particular policy, taking care to avoid 
prohibited lobbying activity.) 
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The DI goals, as set forth in a progress report to the Foundation‘s Board in 1999 
were stated as: 
 
 Creating an objective information base about the impact of devolution. 
 Sharing the findings with policymakers and the public. 
 Using the information and other community resources to promote public 




The Foundation‘s early decisions about the Initiative arose from two sources.  The 
first was a brief ―premises‖ paper that laid the foundations for the Initiative and its 
evaluation:
6
  The premises described were: 
 
Premise 1:  While devolution creates new potential for citizen involvement, 
participation in devolution processes can be enhanced by increasing the 
capacity and confidence of grassroots and local leaders to influence policy.  
Capacity building is an activity that can be effectively carried out by intermediary 
organizations with statewide coalitions.
7
 
   
Premise 2:  It is possible to build essential learning relationships among a set 
of grantees.  Through the Devolution Strategy, the grantees will produce, 
enhance, and capture information from their constituencies and target audiences 
and get information to them in a two-way facilitated exchange of information.  
Innovative means and creative channels of dissemination will need to be pursued 
which facilitate moving relevant information to the right people at the right time.  
The grantees will build individual and collective knowledge which will provide 
ongoing influence in decision making processes regarding devolution, and will 
reach and involve other groups in their learning process.  However, we recognize 
that information packaging, dissemination, and utilization are necessary – but by 
themselves insufficient – to galvanize participation in policy processes. 
 
Premise 3:  The Devolution Strategy represents an innovative form of 
grantmaking for WKKF
8
 because it combines in a single strategy 
information producers, advocacy organizations, a policy focus, and the 
involvement of program directors from multiple programming areas across 
the Foundation.  We want to learn the extent to which grantmaking can create 
interrelationships among nontraditional partner grantees as a result of our 
                                               
5  ―The Devolution Initiative: Application of Knowledge to the Problems of People,‖ A Program Initiative 
Progress Report, April 14-15, 1999.  This formulation of the goals of the Initiative, or close approximations 
of it, appears in most of the Foundation‘s documentation and on its website. 
  
6  W. K. Kellogg Foundation, ―Devolution Initiative Premise Paper,‖ December 18, 1996. 
 
7  This meant national intermediary organizations with state affiliates – a premise that would be revisited in 
1999. 
 
8  WKKF is the acronym used internally and by the Devolution Initiative evaluators to refer to the Kellogg 
Foundation. 
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investment that go beyond the activities of individual projects.  In other words, we 
intend to determine if it is possible to create working conditions among the 
grantees that will yield policy effects such that the sum is greater than individual 
contributions. 
 
Premise 4:  Devolution is likely to cause significant changes in relationships 
between nonprofit organizations, government at all levels, and philanthropy.  
The Devolution Strategy is an opportunity for the WKKF to participate in a 
co-evolutionary process with its five grantee partners
9
 that will ultimately 
allow each participant to continue to be an effective player in a devolved 
world.  WKKF‘s funding presence in devolution creates unique opportunities for 
organizational learning that will allow WKKF to be responsive to a changing 
environment while at the same time remaining true to its mission of helping 
people help themselves. 
 
 This premises document was authored by Ricardo Millet, the Foundation‘s 
evaluation director, Mark Lelle, an evaluation unit staff member at the time, and Alice 
Warner, who was a consultant to the Foundation helping organize the Devolution 
Initiative.  It was the first step – described as a ―learning manifesto‖ by Warner -- in 
developing a logic model for the Initiative, which would evolve as the initiative and 
evaluation evolved.  The first of several versions of the logic model was developed 
several months later and included in an evaluation proposal by the Harvard Family 
Research Project (HFRP) to the Foundation in October 1997.  Based on the statements of 
the premise paper and conversations with Foundation staff, HFRP set out the strategy and 
expected outcomes of the Devolution Initiative this way: 
WKKF Devolution Initiative
























June 10, 1997Harvard Family Research Project
 
                                               
9
  The first five grants for the Devolution Initiative were made in July 1996, before the ―Premises Paper‖ 
was prepared. 
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The second source of early decisions about the Devolution Initiative and its 
evaluation was the deliberations and explorations of a cross-foundation team formed in 
1996.  Alice Warner described the team‘s starting point in this way:  ―We didn‘t do 
policy, we didn‘t do cross-foundation work, and we didn‘t do research.‖  Nevertheless, a 
task force that included 15 to 20 program directors began a series of meetings to ―see 
how to do cross-foundation programming‖ around devolution, according to Warner, and 
the group made decisions resulting in a July 1996 request to the Foundation‘s Board for 
the first of what would be four appropriations for the Devolution Initiative.  Five grants 
were proposed, to support two nonprofit research institutions and three national advocacy 
organizations.  The task force formed a ―Core Team‖ for decisionmaking in late 1996. 
 
 In this early process of creating the Devolution Initiative, the decision was also 
made to manage it internally rather than to engage an intermediary organization – in part, 
to use the DI experience to practice cross-foundation work.  Bill Richardson also had in 
mind that an internally managed initiative would maximize the Foundation‘s learning 
about devolution and maximize the Foundation‘s impact on the unfolding of devolution.   
To aid the internal thinking and management, consultants were brought in to advise on 
several aspects of the Initiative.  These included specialists in policy and 
communications, who stayed with the DI over its course.  Several evaluators were also 
brought in to participate in ―framing‖ the initiative, including Heather Weiss of the 
Harvard Family Research Project, whose organization was selected in late 1997 to 
conduct an outside evaluation of the Initiative. 
 
 
 The Evaluation:  A Focus on Learning about Grantees Informing Policy 
 
 The Harvard Family Research Project‘s evaluation design prioritized two goals – 
informing evolving Devolution Initiative strategy and fostering ongoing learning within 
the Foundation and with grantees.  The primary audiences for evaluation findings were 
internal to the DI, rather than external audiences such as policymakers or the public.  The 
DI evaluation approach emphasized examining results against the stated DI strategy for 
real-time learning.  HFRP staff recognized that the devolution process would unfold 
without a predictable script and that new variables would have to be taken into account 
regularly.  Rather than viewing this emergent process as a threat to evaluation – as it 
might have been in a conventional evaluation design of the time – the idea was to 
recognize the reality of change, and use the evaluation to stay on top of change and learn 
from it. 
 
In its October 1997 proposal, the Harvard Family Research Project evaluators put 
forth the following questions for addressing the impact of the Devolution Initiative: 
 
(1) Is information reaching the intended audiences? Are different audiences 
finding it useful?  What else do they need? 
(2) Are information providers adapting the type, form or timing of information in 
light of evolving customer needs?  Is a critical mass of information available 
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to meet customer needs and stimulate diverse stakeholder interest and 
engagement? 
(3)  Is the information getting to intermediary organizations?  Are intermediary 
organizations building the capacity of groups to use information? 
(4)  Are a range of groups getting and using information to inform policy 
discussion, development and modification? 
(5)  Is there evidence the Initiative is working so that policymakers are using 
information and stakeholder input to inform the policy agenda and decisions? 
 
HFRP‘s evaluation used mixed (quantitative and qualitative) and multiple methods to 
assess the Initiative‘s complex layers.  The evaluators also used triangulation – the use of 
multiple methods and/or data sources to study the same phenomenon – to examine the 
DI‘s intended outcomes and corroborate findings.  A full list of evaluation methods and 
data sources is included in Appendix C. 
 
 The process of devising this evaluation plan and the process of carrying it out 
involved complicated issues of attribution.  A question that kept coming up was:  What 
should be learned about the ―value added‖ of the Foundation‘s investments in the 
Devolution Initiative?  At an early design stage, this question was discussed in terms of 
what was possible to learn about changes that could be attributed to DI.  Then, in various 
discussions about how the evaluators should spend their time and effort, the question 
became:  What should the evaluators try to learn about attribution?  And at the end of the 
Initiative, the question asked – particularly by the Foundation‘s Board -- was:  What was 
actually learned about the DI‘s contribution to policy? 
  
Ricardo Millett, the Foundation‘s Director of Evaluation at that time, strongly 
believed that a conventional evaluation approach would not be useful in learning about 
the Devolution Initiative.  The Foundation needed to understand ―contribution, as 
opposed to attribution‖ – meaning that trying to link Foundation-funded activity to effects 
in the devolution policy landscape was important, but not as important as learning about 
―information sharing and points of connection,‖ according to Millett.  Heather Weiss 
added credibility to the approach because of her strong reputation, Millett says. 
 
 The Harvard Family Research Project (HFRP) evaluators also felt that a fresh 
evaluation approach underscoring collaboration, continuous feedback, learning and 
flexibility was more appropriate than traditional evaluation approaches.  As the HFRP 
proposal stated: 
 
The nature of the Initiative – particularly its evolving character, diffuse 
―treatment‖ and probable ―contamination‖ of the treatment by other non-WKKF 
information and capacity-building efforts – is such that experimental or 
comparison group designs are not feasible.  Therefore, it will not be possible to 
make definitive causal statements about the impact of the Initiative.   
The proposed design provides data to test whether a plausible and credible case 
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can be made that the Initiative worked as modeled and positively affected the 




The evaluators noted that attribution of changes in policy to the Devolution Initiative 
investments would not have been possible because several other national foundations 
were funding the DI grantee organizations to do the same or similar work across the 
country. 
 
 Bill Richardson was also disinclined to worry about attribution early on.  He said, 
―If we had gotten bogged down at the beginning with the question of how do we know 
we‘re making a difference, the Initiative would never have gotten off the ground.‖   
Richardson was more concerned that the Foundation ―keep track of what we‘re doing‖ 
and learn whether some of the key policy-informing goals of the DI were being met, such 
as whether key national grantees were becoming capable of ―working outside the 
Beltway.‖ 
 
An evaluation design was chosen with both formative and summative 
components.  In its formative approach, the evaluation was intended to provide timely, 
continuous feedback to the Foundation based on both qualitative and quantitative data 
collection about the initiative as a whole, including how grantee activities were -- or were 
not – adding up to the DI strategy envisioned by the Foundation.  In addition, the 
evaluation was intended to facilitate clarification of grantees‘ goals; create a learning 
system among grantees, consultant partners, and the involved Foundation staff; and 
provide suggestions and assistance for ―continuous improvement.‖  The evaluation was 
planned as a mechanism for strategic thinking about the Initiative throughout its course, 
to help the Foundation manage the initiative by feeding information to a Core Team 
making decisions about next steps.  These evaluation goals were described in the October 
1997 proposal to Kellogg for the evaluation from the Harvard Family Research Project 
team: 
 
(1) To work with WKKF and grantees to identify, refine, and modify important 
areas of inquiry and measurement that will inform the activities of the 
Initiative; 
(2) To provide baseline and continuous information about these measurement 
areas; and 
(3) To provide a mechanism for the timely flow of strategic information and 





 The Harvard Family Research Project team leaders characterized the situation 
going into the evaluation in this way: 
 
                                               
10  Harvard Family Research Project.  W. K. Kellogg Foundation Devolution Initiative Evaluation Proposal, 
October 10, 1997, p. 4. 
 
11  Harvard Family Research Project, p. 7.  The proposal‘s introduction to these three ―interrelated‖ goals 
cites the December 18, 1996, paper by Kellogg Foundation staff known as the ―premises paper.‖ 
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From the outset, the Initiative raised formidable challenges for both the 
Foundation and its evaluation.  First, the cross-foundation team approach to 
grantmaking was completely uncharted territory.  A process for collective and 
collaborative decisionmaking did not exist.  Second, existing grants were 
retrofitted into a new initiative in which grantees were expected to work together, 
in addition to completing the terms of their original grants.  The Foundation was 
challenged to make the whole of the Devolution Initiative greater than the sum of 
its individual parts.  Evaluators were expected to help create as well as track ―the 
whole.‖  Third, the funding of policy work and advocacy was a new direction for 
the Foundation.  Fourth, there were many questions about how best to evaluate a 
complex initiative and particularly one that involved advocacy and policy.  New 
approaches, such as theory of change evaluation, were emerging but had not been 
widely tested.  Fifth, the approach of involving evaluators from the start was a 
relatively new one within the Foundation, particularly with respect to the 
evaluation‘s relationship to the cross-foundation leadership team.  And finally, all 
of this was taking place within an environment of restructuring and downsizing 
within the Foundation,
12
 which meant that membership on the Foundation‘s core 
leadership team shifted over the course of the Initiative. 
 
One method of strategy support by the evaluators for the Initiative focused on 
reviewing and refining the DI logic model.  According to the evaluators, this helped 
structure conversations in the DI core team about different ways in which the Initiative 
could develop.  The logic model was revised several times, and elaborated, over the 
course of the Initiative.  The underlying evolution of the Foundation team‘s thinking 
confirmed for the evaluators the emerging nature of the Initiative as the devolution policy 
landscape clarified, and thus confirmed as well the need for a formative evaluation 
design.  According to Heather Weiss, ―We recognized at the outset that much about the 
Initiative would change over time, and that the evaluation would need to help inform 
those changes as well as adjust to them.  We didn‘t anticipate, however, the extent of the 
changes that would come.‖ 
 
Some DI core team members felt too much time was spent on the logic model, 
however.  Teresa Behrens, the current Director of Evaluation at the Foundation (who was 
not involved in the Initiative) saw the multiple revisions as evidence of lack of clarity 
about goals and methods.  ―It is not clear to me whether the revisions were based on new 
data or new thinking, or whether the multiple versions of the logic model were attempts 
to achieve consensus among program staff.‖ Anne Petersen, Senior Vice President for 
Programs
13
, agrees.  She notes that a theory of change ―is always flexible as things are 
learned in the course of doing an initiative, but not gaining agreement at the outset let it 
[the DI] be lots of things to different people.  This was the Achilles heel for quite some 
time in the Initiative.‖ 
 
                                               
12  In 1998, the Foundation reduced its staff and grant portfolios by about a third due to declines in Kellogg 
company stock, which constituted about 70 percent of the Foundation‘s assets. 
 
13 Anne Petersen retired from the W. K. Kellogg Foundation in August, 2005. 
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Ricardo Millett admits that this observation is partly true, citing the advances in 
logic modeling for evaluation since 1997 as a positive development, as well as the 
Foundation staff‘s need in 1996 to support studies by several national research 
institutions of the effects of devolution.  He also judges the evaluators to have been 
―clever‖ not to try to nail down a detailed theory of change at the beginning: 
 
The original intent was to start with a theory of change design and have it be the 
driver of the evaluation.  Heather [Weiss of HFRP] quickly realized that this 
conventional approach might not be seen as practical.  So, instead of using a 
theory of change to understand and direct the implementation process, it became 
more of an explanatory paradigm that was fleshed out over time.  Heather 
understood the actors and institutional context and was clever to shift. 
 
In noting that ―attribution‖ was not a primary objective of the evaluation, Millett 
also points to the evaluators‘ challenge to satisfy multiple Foundation clients:  Even 
though Millett did not think an experimental evaluation approach made any sense for an 
initiative finding its way in an emerging policy landscape, the Foundation‘s co-chairs of 
the Devolution Initiative were frequently asked by Board members what difference DI 
was making and how the Foundation staff would know.  According to Petersen, leaving 
the theory of change too flexible meant never being able to get to the intended impacts. 
 
The summative component of the evaluation became more prominent late in the 
DI course in order to respond to this concern, but, in the view of several Foundation 
observers, it did not fully succeed in answering the question about the Initiative‘s impact.  
While some observers conclude that the evaluation emphasized learning about 
information flow and the utility of information for advocacy, rather than the results of 
information on policy, the evaluators disagree.  And Millett concurs with the evaluators 
that they ―tried hard to make the connection between the DI activities and policy 
outcomes.‖  The Harvard Family Research Project evaluators cite their tracking of 22 
policies in 1999-2000 and 47 policies in 2000-2001, combined with quantitative and 
qualitative state-level data collection, as a significant effort to determine if a plausible 
case could be made that the DI grantee efforts contributed to policy outcomes.  The 
evaluators reported that the ―intended policy results‖ were achieved for 17 of the 22 
issues that grantees informed in 1999-2000 and 32 of 47 issues in 2000-2001.
14
  
However, they were never invited by the Foundation to sum up the whole of the DI 
experience in an analysis that might be recognized as a typical final evaluation report.  
 
In the late stages of the Devolution Initiative, the Foundation employed a 
communications strategy to answer the question of impact.  For example, materials 
accompanying the final appropriation request to the Board for the Devolution Initiative 
told ―stories‖ of new voices in state and local policy decisions and the human face of the 
Initiative – stories that were prepared by the Foundation‘s Communications unit, not the 
evaluators, although they were based upon evaluation learning reports and findings.  The 
story of the Devolution Initiative for public audiences employed a communications 
strategy as well, which is discussed further below. 
                                               
14
  Harvard Family Research Project, W. K. Kellogg Foundation’s Devolution Initiative: Learning Report, 
1997-2001 Evaluation Findings, February 2002, p. 31.  
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Moving Parts and Moving Targets 
 
Much of the evolution of the Initiative and its evaluation can be understood in the 
context of the Foundation staff‘s response to the shortcomings they came to recognize in 
the initial strategy – shortcomings that, in the view of the evaluators, they uncovered and 
brought to the attention of the DI core team.  It became apparent that the funded national 
research institutions were accustomed to speaking to a national policy audience and were, 
in some cases, unsuited for the task of producing policy information useful for advocacy 
organizations, in general, and specifically for the state and local players in devolution.  It 
also became apparent that national advocacy organizations, in some cases, did not have 
the resources, or the requisite relationships with each other or with their own local 
affiliates, to lead capacity building for effective state and local coalition building and 
citizen mobilization.  In response, two years into the Initiative, the Foundation added a 
new set of grants and activities to build capacity for informing policy at the state and 
local levels of devolution.  Further into the Initiative, a Scholar/Practitioner Program was 
added to support state and local policy research and serve as a policy training ground for 
minority scholars.  (A description of the stages of the Initiative, including the shift to a 
state focus, begins on page 17 below.) 
 
The result of these and other decisions was that the Initiative got complicated and, 
consequently, the evaluation of the Initiative got complicated.  As several people 
interviewed for this case said, referring to either the Initiative or its evaluation -- or the 
two together:  ―It had a lot of moving parts.‖  In the end, the complicated DI strategy and 
an evaluation designed to keep track of all the moving parts – but not to sum up its 
impact -- contributed to an indistinct ―bottom line.‖  Petersen notes that the evaluation 
should have helped to clarify, but instead added to the complexity. 
 
A separate internal evaluation of the Devolution Initiative provides information 
about how this experience affected the Foundation.  As the Foundation‘s first significant 
cross-program initiative, the first significant policy-focused initiative, and the first major 
initiative evaluation not managed within a program division, the Devolution Initiative 
introduced some ways of doing business that have had lasting effects.  Lessons 
documented in two internal evaluation reports are drawn from for this case, along with 
staff observations, to illuminate how the DI served the purposes of the Foundation‘s 
leadership to restructure and strengthen the philanthropy‘s ways of working. 
 
Background:  The Foundation People and the Institution 
 
 At the time the Devolution Initiative was being formed, the Foundation had four 
major program areas:  Health, Youth and Education, Philanthropy and Volunteerism, and 
Food Systems and Rural Development.  Foundation President Richardson had also 
instituted a ―matrix‖ structure with themes that cross-cut these four program areas, 
including Leadership, Social and Economic Community Development, Capitalizing on 
Diversity, and Information and Communication Technology.  In addition, there were 
geographically defined programs for Greater Battle Creek (MI), Southern Africa, and 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
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A key organizational decision for the Initiative was the naming of C. Patrick 
Babcock as the Foundation‘s Director of Policy.  Babcock had joined the Kellogg 
Foundation in 1991 as a program director in Health programs after serving as the director 
of the Michigan Department of Social Services.  In 1995 he became the director of the 
Foundation‘s new Policy department, one of four parts of a new ―Impact Services unit,‖ 
which also included the Foundation‘s Marketing and Communications, Technology, and 
Evaluation departments.  The unit‘s name was intended to signal a commitment to 
increasing the impact of program activities.  (The unit has since been expanded to include 
two additional departments, Organizational Services and Program Learning.) 
 
Babcock became co-chair of the Devolution Initiative with a long-time 
Foundation vice president, Dan Moore, and brought to the Initiative the perspective of 
what is needed to affect state and local public policy.  Moore was Vice President for 
Philanthropy and Voluntarism at the time, having held three different Vice Presidential 
jobs.  Both co-chairs were experienced bridge builders, according to Moore, and both 
were committed to a participatory, consensus-based approach to running the Devolution 
Initiative. 
 
The Impact Services unit reported to Senior Vice President Anne Petersen, as did 
all regular program areas.  Petersen was brought into the Foundation by Richardson in 
1996, shortly after the Devolution Initiative got started.  The Devolution Initiative, 
however, was a cross-program operation, staffed by program directors (Kellogg‘s 
equivalent of ―program officers‖) from three of the four program areas.  Initially, budgets 
for DI grantmaking were under the authority of the cross-foundation team, while budgets 
supporting program director staff remained under the control of program areas.
15
  In 
recognition of the administrative challenges involved in a cross-program initiative that 
was expected to be significant, a consultant who assisted Pat Babcock, Alice Warner, was 
hired to provide full-time support to the Initiative; she was joined in 1999 by a program 
assistant, Diane Smith.  After Smith joined the DI group, she became solely responsible 
for tracking all DI grants, contracts, and budgets centrally, regardless of where the grants 
were ―housed‖ or which program director was responsible. 
 
 Ricardo Millett headed the Evaluation department that, after Richardson took over 
the Foundation, became part of Impact Services, and he continued in that role until April 
2001.  Millett reports that Kellogg was an early leader in philanthropic evaluation with 
the ―insight to give credence to program evaluation.‖  But, he says, implementing the 
commitment was difficult.  The historical problems included typical foundation struggles 
for control of resources.  The evolution of the evaluation function at Kellogg was not 
unlike what was going on in foundation evaluation units across philanthropy, according 
to Dan Moore, who served as the Foundation‘s Vice President for Strategic Planning, 
Evaluation and Technology in 1990 and 1991.  Ironically, while it was difficult to 
implement evaluation inside the Foundation, the Foundation‘s reputation as a leader in 
                                               
15  As described in the internal evaluation of the Devolution Initiative, the financial and grantmaking 
―architecture‖ of the Foundation was not suited for cross-program activity and complicated the work of the 
DI team considerably. 
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program evaluation outside the Foundation was elevated by two popular evaluation 
manuals published on the Foundation‘s website during Millett‘s tenure.16 17 
 
Inside the Foundation, there was concern on the part of program staff that the 
evaluation unit aspired to independence.  Working against this was a structure in which 
program areas controlled all evaluation funding except for staff-related costs of the 
evaluation unit.  They also selected and managed evaluators of projects and did not share 
the results of project evaluations with the evaluation unit.  In Millett‘s description, 
evaluation was a foundation-wide service to programs that was ―rejectable‖ – meaning 
that program staff could accept or reject it as they chose.  On the other hand, program 
vice presidents acted to create new evaluation manager positions during the process of 
downsizing that occurred in 1998, according to Anne Petersen. 
 
The current Evaluation Director at the Foundation, Teresa Behrens, says that this 
structure was not the only reason that program areas were deeply involved in evaluations.  
The evaluation unit was never fully staffed until late 2003, according to Behrens, so 
―program directors had to be more involved in controlling the content of evaluation 
because there wasn‘t the expertise in the evaluation department of Impact Services.  [That 
department] had a ‗chicken and egg‘ problem of staff turnover:  There were not enough 
staff, so the existing staff were too stretched and were not able to do the job well.‖ 
 
Anne Petersen saw resistance to the accountability of evaluation.  She observes 
that the Foundation‘s evaluation work has historically focused on process:  ―The motto 
was ‗improve, not prove,‘ but there was no structure for learning from even the process 
evaluations – the ‗improve‘ part.‖  Further, Petersen observes that ―there was never a 
serious interest in results-oriented evaluation at the Foundation…There‘s a fear of 
assessment or fear of feedback.  It‘s a lack of trust in how it‘s going to be used.‖  With 
respect to the DI evaluation, Petersen reported that ―the view of a lot of staff was to keep 
it as far away from them as possible.‖ 
 
 Millett saw progress toward resolving the typical program versus evaluation 
tensions in the years just before the Devolution Initiative and this progress has since 
continued, according to Behrens.  Petersen concurs, crediting both Behrens and a greater 
                                               
16  W. K. Kellogg Foundation,  Logic Model Development Guide: Using Logic Models to Bring Together 
Planning, Evaluation & Action, updated December 2001, and W. K. Kellogg Foundation, Evaluation 
Handbook, January 1998. 
 
17  Another of the legacies of evaluation at the W. K. Kellogg Foundation was the concept of ―cluster 
evaluation.‖  The term was adopted in 1988 by a previous Kellogg evaluation director to describe the 
practice of evaluating collections of projects with similar goals.  This practice shaped the development of 
the Devolution Initiative, although there are different views of what ―cluster evaluation‖ is.  In one view, 
―The Kellogg Foundation continues to use this [cluster evaluation] approach, now emphasizing systemic 
and policy-change outcomes, as well as the process for identifying common themes in retrospect, after 
grants have been made.‖  Ross F. Conner, Victor Kuo, Marli S. Melton, and Ricardo A. Millett.  ―Adapting 
Evaluation to Accommodate Foundations‘ Structural and Cultural Characteristics‖ in Marc T. Braverman, 
Norman A. Constantine, Jana Kay Slater (eds.),  Foundations and Evaluation: Contexts and Practices for 
Effective Philanthropy, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004, p. 172.  Teresa Behrens, the current Director of 
Evaluation at the Kellogg Foundation, thinks that the DI – and therefore, its evaluation -- was more like a 
cluster of similar projects and less like a unified initiative than initially conceived. 
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insistence on evaluation from the Board.  The evaluation department developed an 
internal contracting procedure that outlined the roles and responsibilities of the unit, 
which included the selection of evaluators, and co-management of evaluation budgets 
with program directors, for example.  The Foundation expectation, going into the DI, was 
that major initiatives for Board review and approval would be evaluated and that 
initiative leaders had to articulate expected outcomes in the initial Board materials. 
 
 The Devolution Initiative was an opportunity for the Evaluation department to put 
into practice some of the beliefs about program effectiveness espoused in the Kellogg-
published manuals and in technical assistance provided to other foundations using these 
materials.  It was also an unusual opportunity to manage an evaluation.  According to 
Alice Warner, Millett ―held the contract‖ for the DI evaluation, which would not have 
happened if the DI had been housed within a program area.   (Millett acted as the liaison 
between the Harvard Family Research Project evaluation team and the Foundation until 
his departure in April 2001, when the evaluation team began reporting to Pat Babcock 
and Alice Warner in the Foundation‘s Policy department.)  For the Devolution Initiative, 
the evaluation unit ―preached early [evaluation] involvement in the initiative 
development process and theories of change to help frame evaluation designs,‖ according 
to Millett.  He said this approach was generally accepted, at least at the beginning of the 
DI process, because it was championed by Pat Babcock, who was highly regarded in the 
Foundation.  In some ways, however, the resulting evaluation was a compromise from 
Millett‘s perspective, as discussed below.  (See ―Views of the Devolution Initiative 
Evaluation.‖) 
 
Also important to the Devolution Initiative was the Foundation‘s Marketing and 
Communications department within the Impact Services unit.  Headed by Karen Lake, 
the department managed a national opinion survey and the ―roll out‖ of survey findings 
that launched the second – state and local – phase of the Devolution Initiative; designed 
and operated a comprehensive website that featured hundreds of articles and materials 
published on devolution-related topics by participating grantees; and published a book to 
tell the DI story to external audiences, entitled Building Bridges Between Policy and 
People: Devolution in Practice, Lessons from the W. K. Kellogg Foundation’s Devolution 
Initiative.  The Marketing and Communications department also assembled a 
―disseminators group‖ among the DI grantees to collectively advance the goals of the 
Initiative through information strategies and to ―avoid redundancy and unnecessary use 
of funds,‖ according to Lake.  Importantly, Lake says, the group included members of the 
policy and evaluation teams, including all consultant groups that supported these areas.  
In Lake‘s view, their involvement helped to keep efforts closely aligned and in support of 
one another. 
  
 Not unlike the evolution of evaluation at the Foundation, the communications role 
vis a vis program shifted over time.  Historically, the unit housing communications 
looked at dissemination only, and did this at the end point of projects for project reports, 
and annual reports.  The shift was to ―having Communications at the table at the 
beginning of an initiative,‖ Lake says, beginning with a Community Partners in Health 
Professions initiative in the early 1990s.  Lake says the idea in this shift was to ask, 
―What is it we‘re trying to change and how can we use these tools – communications, 
evaluation, policy, and technology – to leverage impact?‖  Communications played this 
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at-the-table-early role in the Devolution Initiative, participating in the Core Team that 
managed the Initiative and served as the executive decisionmaking body.  How much of 
the Foundation‘s final story about the Devolution Initiative was shaped by an evaluation 
perspective and how much by a communications perspective – where both were involved 







 The Devolution Initiative Team selected the Harvard Family Research Project 
(HFRP) as the evaluator for the initiative, with Ricardo Millett serving at the primary 
advocate for HFRP.  While other evaluation groups were invited to propose their ideas 
for the DI evaluation, HFRP, led by Heather Weiss, persuaded the DI Core Team that 
they understood what was being asked for and that they could deliver it.  In part, this 
occurred over the course of a year-long consultancy by Weiss to the Team before HFRP 
was selected as the DI‘s outside evaluator.  According to Weiss, Millett wanted a group 
that knew the substantive issues as well as evaluation, an approach that supported real-
time learning, and people who could work within the ―shared governance‖ structure of 
the DI and its evaluation.  (From Millett‘s perspective, it was clear that the challenges 
would require evaluators with ―a lot of patience.‖)  Pat Babcock wanted an evaluator with 
both quantitative and qualitative skills, a track record of innovation, and the ability to 
manage ―lots of moving parts.‖  ―We were looking for someone who could give us their 
best judgment,‖ Babcock said. 
 
In its October 1997 proposal, the HFRP offered a multi-dimensional set of 
services to the Foundation: 
 
 Tracking and documentation of information flows to learn how and with what 
content the grantees were reaching their target audiences; 
 An analytic component to provide information about whether the documented 
information flows were likely to achieve the Foundation goals of informed 
policymakers and informed and empowered citizens; 
 A theoretical component, offering a framework for effective application of 
knowledge to the policy process; 
 A strategic development component, embedded in a process of unpacking and 
helping Foundation staff articulate and refine their assumptions about grantee 
activities and effects -- as expressed in an evolving logic model; 
 A learning system building component, facilitating meetings of grantees and 
Foundation staff to review events, understandings, and lessons – particularly by 
providing lesson-oriented documents in advance of these meetings; and 
 A measurement component, designed both to ―count‖ the output of the DI 
grantees in meaningful ways and to assess the effects of grantee activities on 
policy based on a standard of plausibility (rather than proven attribution). 
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HFRP proposed to stage these activities over the five-year course of the Initiative, 
emphasizing relationships for strategy and network building early, measurement late, and 
tracking and documentation throughout.  Ultimately, the evaluators produced more than 
40 documents for the Foundation about the Devolution Initiative, sequenced with data 
collection and reporting to inform Initiative decisionmaking and learning needs.  (See 
Appendix A for a list of evaluation reports and their timing.) 
 
 Weiss and her team‘s experience in formative evaluation not only involved a high 
degree of communication with program people unusual in evaluation practice, but an 
active role in helping program people formulate their theories of change.  This role would 
come to look like a seat at the decisionmaking table to some Foundation participants.  But 
to others, it looked like the evaluators ―putting the Foundation staffs‘ feet to the fire‖ 
about what they wanted to accomplish and, to still others, it looked like the evaluators 
bearing bad news or opening up topics on which a consensus had not been reached 
among the DI Core Team members. 
 
 The evaluation team eventually included Weiss as the Principal Investigator, Julia 
Coffman as the evaluation‘s Project Manager, five senior Research Associates and two 
Research Assistants.  Team members worked close to full time on the Devolution 
Initiative evaluation. 
 
The Major Stages of the Devolution Initiative 
 
After the creation of a Task Force and then a smaller Core Team, and 
recommendations for the first five grants to the Foundation Board, all in 1996, the 
Initiative shifted to a stage of trying to understand how to connect the national grantees 
funded in the first and second round of DI grants to state- and community-level 
organizations that were, theoretically, at the front of devolution.  According to Heather 
Weiss and Julia Coffman of HFRP, ―there was lot of discussion about how to ‗drill down‘ 
from the national level, or how to make sure that the Initiative would ‗have legs.‘  It was 
in the logic model, but not in their grantmaking.‖  At the September 1998 annual 
networking meeting of grantees, Foundation staff and consultants, which was held at 
Gallaudet University in Washington, D.C., discussion focused on ―where does DI hit the 
ground at the state and community level?‖ 
 
 According to the evaluators, when Dan Moore, Pat Babcock and Ricardo Millett 
brought the Gallaudet discussion back to the Foundation, there was a ―go‖ for adding a 
new set of activities to produce, disseminate, and help users work with information for 
policy advocacy in a concentrated effort in selected states.  Organizations in Florida, 
Mississippi, Montana, New York, Washington, and Wisconsin were selected for state-
level grants to ensure that the Devolution Initiative‘s investment in producing 
information would, indeed, ―hit the ground.‖18  Foundation program directors were 
assigned to oversee the state-level investments and the Harvard Family Research Project 
added evaluation methodology to track state- and local-level investments and outcomes.  
HFRP field staff were assigned to track the activities of the state- and local-level grantees 
                                               
18
  Florida, Mississippi, New York, Washington, and Wisconsin were known as ―focus states.‖  In Montana, 
a nonprofit advocacy organization worked with the state‘s seven tribal governments. 
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and, therefore, in addition to tracking and reporting on the work of the overall Initiative, 
evaluators began reporting separately on work and outcomes in each of the states selected 
for focused attention. 
 
Then, according to the evaluators, a year-long discussion ensued among the 
Foundation players about community mobilization theories.  There were multiple points 
of view across the Devolution Initiative Core Team.  This discussion showed up in 
changes to the DI logic model with the addition of a new objective -- to ―Include New 
Voices‖ in the policy process. 
 
 In 2000, evaluation results from the national partners began to highlight health 
disparities, and economic and social disparities, across population groups in the U.S.  
Data from the Immigrant Welfare Implementation Collaborative, the Urban Institute, and 
the Joint Center on Political and Economic Studies, for example, spurred those grantees 
and others to start looking at the effects of devolution on Native Americans, immigrants 
and other groups, and provided the content and direction for the work of the 
Scholar/Practitioner groups in two states (New York and Mississippi). 
 
 Another shift occurred when the Core Team realized that a push to generate and 
disseminate information for state-level policymaking would not necessarily generate 
―new voices‖ in policy discussions and new levels of engagement.  As the evaluators 
tracked the implementation of the DI theory of change implicit in the logic model, it 
became clear that DI investments represented three major ―pathways‖ through the logic 
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Pathway 1 was the most direct route to informing policy, with a line from grantees (in 
this case, national grantees) and their information to informing policy.  Pathway 2 also 
informed policy, but reflected an investment in building unified voices among state and 
community advocates to do it.  Later DI investments in state grantees and their 
community-based partners ―gave legs‖ to and pushed for results along Pathway 2.  
Pathway 3 ―drilled down‖ deeper into communities and reflected an investment in state 
grantees and their community-based partners to build capacity of community members, 
particularly new voices underrepresented in the policy process, to inform policy.  (These 
pathways were unpacked from a comprehensive model that appears in Appendix D.) 
 
Foundation program directors disagreed on which pathway should be a priority 
for the Devolution Initiative.  Specifically, there was a lack of consensus about whether it 
should be a priority to encourage and empower new participants in policy discussions at 
the community and state level (Pathway 3), or whether the priority was to actually 
influence state-level policy (Pathway 2), which efforts to include new participants might 
dilute.  The lack of consensus on this point led to the Foundation‘s state-assigned 
program directors each ―doing their own thing,‖ according to the evaluators. 
 
As the national part of Initiative was drawing to a close in 2001, Pat Babcock and 
Alice Warner asked the HFRP team to focus on the sustainability of the processes and 
organizations initiated under DI to continue to inform policy, and measurement of the 
Initiative‘s effects.  (State-level DI work continued for an additional two years with 
supplemental funding from the Foundation.)  The evaluators fielded a survey at this stage 
to document the extent to which state-level policymakers attended to DI grantees‘ 
communications.  They also developed ―stories‖ using human interest journalism 
techniques to communicate how devolution was ―hitting the ground‖ in the states selected 
for the Initiative.  The evaluators summed up findings for the three pathways to 
informing policy in a series of reports in November 2001,
19
 which were consolidated and 
summarized for a final briefing of Foundation staff by the evaluators in February 2002.  
These reports were prepared for an internal audience – i.e., the Foundation staff and 
grantees. 
 
In a separate effort to tell the DI story at this stage – preparing for an end-of-
project conference with the national grantees originally scheduled for October 2001 (and 
rescheduled after the events of September 11 to be held in January 2002) -- the 
Foundation‘s Marketing and Communications department set out to produce a book to 
explain the Devolution Initiative to the policy and public audiences, which was published 
December 1, 2001. 
 
Views of the Devolution Initiative Evaluation 
 
In general, the Foundation staff interviewed for this case found the DI evaluation 
helpful and enriching to the implementation of the Initiative.  But it was also complicated 
and organizationally difficult.  Miguel Satut, a program director from the Foundation‘s 
Youth and Education area who was responsible for overseeing DI implementation in 
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  Harvard Family Research Project.   Pathway 1: 1997-2001 Findings and Implications; Pathway 2: 
1999-2001 Findings and Implications; Pathway 3: 1999-2001 Findings and Implications, November 2001. 
  20 
Wisconsin, said ―the added value of the Harvard Family Research Project was the larger 
picture of the whole initiative.‖  Barbara Sabol, a program director in Health, appreciated 
having ―a different pair of eyes‖ on what was happening in devolution and among the DI 
grantees in Mississippi, the state that was her responsibility.  ―Knowing that there was an 
evaluation going on reinforced [Sabol‘s intent] to address issues, probe, explore, provide 
assistance.‖  The framework of DI and its evaluation provided an opportunity for 
Mississippi to ―get highlighted for something other than being at the bottom of the pile.‖  
Sabol‘s added-value list for the evaluation includes: 
 
 
 Evidence from a neutral third party; 
 Questions that precipitated thinking and re-thinking; 
 Selective reading of documents for information important to individual states; and 
 Contribution to cohesiveness of the DI group. 
 
On the other hand, according to Sabol, it was expensive –―there was a question of 
balance.‖ 
 
Allocation of resources within the Devolution Initiative was a common criticism 
from program directors who had state responsibilities.  Their view was that national 
grantees received large grants early in the Initiative, but when it was determined that 
information production, dissemination and coalition building were needed at the state, 
local, and tribal levels of government, the resources did not follow.  In contrast, the 
evaluators reported that resources were adequate for them to follow the DI action as the 
number of grantees expanded, the geography changed, and the focus of their activity 
shifted from formative feedback to outcome measurement. 
 
Henrie Treadwell, a Health area program director responsible for overseeing DI in 
Florida, supported the formative approach in terms of the feedback provided – ―there was 
no other way to do it‖ – and believed that the evaluation ―made the process more rich.  
We had to be thoughtful, analytical throughout, willing to reflect and act.‖  She was not 
as appreciative of the evaluation design, however.  To Treadwell, ―the evaluation wasn‘t 
conceptual.  It was not based on ‗Here‘s what we need to know‘ but on ‗Go look 
around.‘‖  In answer to her own question of ―Would it have been possible to specify [the 
evaluation] more carefully?‖ Treadwell said, ―The table wasn‘t set for that discussion on 
either side – to push on what do you really want to know.  The process was arduous.‖ 
 
The mechanism for team learning most often mentioned by Foundation people 
interviewed for this case was a quarterly ―learning meeting‖ of the Foundation‘s Core 
Team facilitated by the evaluators.  To support the evaluation‘s formative component, the 
Harvard Family Research Project designed these meetings as an opportunity to convene 
the Initiative‘s Core leadership team for ―real-time‖ discussion about what was being 
learned from evaluation data collection on topics that had particular relevance to 
upcoming strategic decisions.  Meeting topics were chosen in conjunction with the 
Foundation at the start of each year and the HFRP evaluators distributed briefs averaging 
about 15 pages at least one week in advance of the meetings.  (Appendix B provides a list 
of materials prepared for these meetings.) 
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While the learning meetings were pointed to as an innovation, the discussions 
were not as effective as they might have been, according to Millett, Warner, and 
Babcock.  According to Warner, ―It took a long time to do it well.‖  Pat Babcock‘s view 
is that in the early stages of state-level work, the Foundation‘s program directors knew 
more, sooner about what was happening on the ground than the evaluators were able to 
bring to the discussions; the written materials prepared by the evaluators for the meetings 
were often distributed at the last minute; and the ―team style of meeting conflicted with 
the fact that content was being brought by the evaluators‖ – non-team members playing 
an expert role.  ―We needed better ground rules going into the discussions,‖ he reflected. 
 
In the process of getting these meetings to work well, some Core Team members 
formed the view that the evaluators were inappropriately involved in decisionmaking.  
According to Millett: 
 
The structure of the external evaluation drove the management of the initiative 
because staff came from all over the Foundation and it was so hard to [achieve 
consensus].  Lack of time by the Core Team was an issue. 
 
Heather Weiss and Julia Coffman disagree with this assessment.  In their view, 
the process of pushing Foundation staff to articulate and examine their assumptions about 
how DI activities would affect policy might have given some Core Team members the 
impression that the evaluators were in the lead, but the evaluators were only doing their 
clarifying job.  From the evaluators‘ perspective, they advised the Foundation based on 
evaluation data collected, but the Core team made all Initiative-related decisions.  Pat 
Babcock concurs.  In his view, it was the role of the evaluators to ask hard questions.  
The result was sometimes that this process kept resurfacing issues on which team 
members had ―agreed to disagree,‖ which some participants did not welcome.  Babcock‘s 
priorities about the credibility of ―arms length‖ evaluation versus involvement were 
stated this way:  ―I would rather take the risk of loss of credibility than have an evaluator 
outside the loop.‖  According to Dan Moore, ―the DI unfolding was the driver…The 
strategies of the evaluators to help the Core Team draw out their assumptions and logic 
models worked to force clarity.‖ 
 
Ricardo Millett observed that the DI evaluation sometimes was a compromise.  In 
order to get buy-in for the evaluation in the first place, it had to be more process-oriented 
than outcome-oriented, which was eventually a drawback in terms of credibility, although 
―ultimately, we made the right decision [about choosing the Harvard Family Research 
Project evaluation team].  It was a tough piece of work.‖ 
 
Teri Behrens adds to these views an observation of the détente phenomenon:  In 
the absence of an overarching structure for resolving differences, senior foundation staff 
not only agree to disagree, but they work out the boundaries of their autonomy so that the 
practice of grantmaking within a single organization may differ from area to area by 
informal agreement. 
 
In spite of a favorable overall assessment of the Devolution Initiative evaluation 
by most of the involved Foundation staff, Millett was disappointed, as were others, with 
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the Initiative and the evaluation in terms of the diversity of perspectives included.  
Professor Ronald Walters of the University of Maryland‘s James MacGregor Burns 
Academy of Leadership was brought in to advise the Core Team and the evaluators about 
reaching minority audiences with policy information, and this effort was judged to be 
effective in the early stages of polling and then in shifting the Initiative to a state- and 
local-focused strategy.  Walters was subsequently engaged to head a Scholar/Practitioner 
Program, which was intended to draw minority scholars into DI research on policy topics 
at the state and local levels of the Initiative.  Each state (except Montana) had a 
Scholar/Practitioner team led by a university-based faculty member (known as a 
―mentor‖), whose activities were coordinated by Walters.  Further, the Foundation 
pushed HFRP to diversify its research team.  Neither of these efforts to diversify 
perpectives was deemed successful by the people interviewed for this case.  (Walters was 
not interviewed.) 
 
The relationship between Walters‘ Policy Think consulting group and the HFRP 
was a ―point of tension,‖ according to Millett and there were ―HFRP compromises on 
getting an authentic view from minority communities.‖  There was concern expressed by 
the Foundation‘s program director for the Florida DI activities, Henrie Treadwell, that it 
might not be possible for a white field researcher to ascertain how devolution was 
affecting citizens, particularly people of color, in Miami-Dade County.  Treadwell 
wanted to be sure all voices were being heard in policy discussions.  (Treadwell 
expressed similar concerns about the racial imbalance in the leadership of one of the 
Florida DI grantees.)  Further adding to these tensions was the fact that the person hired 
by HFRP in response to Foundation pressure to diversify its research team worked on the 
evaluation for about two years but did not stay with the organization. 
 
Finally, contributing to the diversity disappointments of the Devolution Initiative, 
the Scholar/Practitioner Program was judged an overall disappointment both because it 
did not prove to be a route for minority scholars to join the national research grantee 
organizations and because some of the SPP teams worked on independent projects of 
their own devising rather than projects connected to the DI activities going in the states.  
Barbara Sabol, the Foundation‘s program director for DI activities in Mississippi found 
the SPP in that state an asset because it produced state-specific research and included 
community voices in dissemination of the research findings.  Pat Babcock notes that the 
Scholar/Practitioner Program contributions in Mississippi and New York State, and in 
Washington State at the end of the Initiative, were most closely related to the work of 
state grantees.  Overall, however, he emphasizes the lack of diversity within the DI as a 
problem throughout its course, and the failure of the Foundation‘s attempts to address the 
problem. 
 
The “Bottom Line” and the Devolution Initiative Legacy 
 
 The Devolution Initiative changed the way the Kellogg Foundation works in 
many ways.   The program directors overseeing state DI work took lessons from the DI 
experience into new initiatives and projects.  For example, Miguel Satut adapted DI 
findings in the Foundation‘s ENLACE initiative (Engaging Latino Communities for 
Education), another project ―with lots of moving parts.‖ 
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When you do state work, the focus has to be very clear to all partners.  You need 
to convene everyone to think about the whole state and you need to recognize that 
there are different central, northern and southern cultures [in New Mexico] as 
well as different histories and conditions.  You need to work intensely and with 
forethought about how to make it all cohere…Don‘t assume that for national 
organizations with state affiliates or chapters, they know at each level what is 
going on at the other level.  Even in the very best national organizations there is a 
lag time for information exchange – and by the time the information gets there, 
state conditions may have changed. 
 
 Within the Foundation, policy work is accepted as a given now.  According to 
Dan Moore, ―policy comes flowing off people‘s tongues more easily‖ and many 
Foundation initiatives involve policy work.  In addition to ENLACE, the SPARK school 
readiness initiative has a big policy component and work with school health systems, 
work in philanthropy calling for accountability, and work in the Food Systems and Rural 
Development area involve policy activities and outcomes.  Alice Warner named the 
Community Voices health care initiative for the underserved and the Turning Point public 
health collaboration with the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation as examples of Kellogg 
Foundation projects that were based on the state capacity built during the Devolution 
Initiative; states involved in DI were selected for these new initiatives because there was 
known capacity in them.  Pat Babcock notes that the Devolution Initiative was one of the 
few times that the Foundation was ―in the middle of the active policy development 
process‖; usually Foundation projects looked at policy earlier or later. 
 
 Anne Petersen says that the Devolution Initiative helped the Kellogg Foundation 
find its policy niche and that Pat Babcock deserves the credit for helping the Foundation 
staff and Board see that ―public will building‖ is that niche. 
 
Before the Devolution Initiative, everyone thought of policy as something that 
happened at a very high level – something that policy wonks and policymakers 
did.   From DI, ―public will building‖ emerged as a more acceptable label for 
voice, participation and advocacy – the idea that people in a community should be 
able to say what they want to have happen.  That fits with [the WKKF mission of] 
helping people help themselves. 
 
Further, understanding and articulating the Foundation‘s policy niche in this way 
has brought clarity to staff and Board assumptions about how information matters, 
according to Petersen: 
 
The fuzziness in the concepts about what we were aiming for was the main 
problem with the Devolution Initiative evaluation.  And, because some of these 
things are politically charged, there was a little of ―working under the radar‖ – 
because the Board was uncertain about the value of policy research and did not 
want to fund research.  Now, more people see information as a tool for change. 
 
 The legacy of the DI evaluation within the Foundation is a strong commitment to 
theories of change.  According to Teri Behrens, however, one of the unresolved 
evaluation issues in the Foundation is:  What is a theory of change – as opposed to a logic 
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model.  According to Anne Petersen, the Kellogg Foundation Board likes and insists on 
the theories of change approach.  In addition, the Board has approved a staged approach 
to designing initiatives that is intended to produce a strong, detailed theory of change at 
the end of an initial exploratory stage – before requests for major investments – partly in 
reaction to what Petersen and some Board members considered vague expectations of the 
Devolution Initiative and its evaluation.  According to Pat Babcock, the Devolution 
Initiative had a ―middle ground‖ theory of change as the strategy evolved for information 
development, dissemination and voice/participation.  ―The [starting] logic model was too 
generic; it was useful to explain what we were trying to do, but we added to it in 
discussion.  It was not fully refined, articulated or even fully developed [at the beginning 
of the DI].‖ 
 
Alice Warner reports that the Foundation is doing much more project and cluster-
focused cross-foundation work as a result of the DI experience, but was just considering 
another initiative-level piece of cross-foundation work in 2004.  She says, ―The DI, in 
influencing many programming processes, has created a template for many initiative 
design features.  Learning from the DI is helping us focus our knowledge management 
more aggressively, and figured into the systems design of finance/operations technology 
as well as the programming systems for technology.‖ 
 
Pat Babcock credits the DI experience with several types of management learning, 
including lessons on how to manage a large, multi-stage initiative and the level of 
resources needed for such ambitious undertakings.  If he were to do something like the DI 
again, he would break the evaluation up into several contracts to more closely fit with the 
different types of learning needed, for example.  The DI confirmed for the Foundation, in 
Babcock‘s view, the value of having an integrated Impact Services Team involved in 
major initiatives, as well as the need for identifying a core team and for practicing team 
decisionmaking. 
 
Bill Richardson sees the Devolution Initiative experience as a bridge for the 
Foundation to new ways of working.  It demonstrated how the Foundation can be a 
catalyst for community mobilization and awareness-raising; heightened the Board‘s 
interest in both policy and evaluation; increased the Foundation‘s evaluation expertise; 
and provided the model for the organization to work through cross-program initiatives. 
 
 The difference that the Devolution Initiative made in terms of social policy is not 
so clear, however.  This is true for two main reasons.  First, while the summative 
component of the external DI evaluation did measure outcomes, such as the number of 
grantees‘ information products, and did attempt to make a credible and plausible case for 
how DI activity at the state and local level influenced policy, there were questions about 
its design and results.  A survey of state decisionmakers got a poor response rate, 
according to Pat Babcock, because it was ―not tied to something recognizable to the 
prospective respondents‖ (such as a state university policy center, instead of the Harvard 
Family Research Project for the Kellogg Foundation‘s Devolution Initiative).  As a result, 
the survey results were not credible, according to Babcock, and the evaluation was 
otherwise ―relatively short on quantitative data.‖ 
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 The evaluators point to their multi-method approach and concluding summary 
reports to counter this assessment, but several people interviewed for this case, including 
the evaluators, reported that the Initiative lost momentum in its final stage and the 
Foundation participants were not have been focused on the ―summing up.‖  The 
Foundation participants were turning their attention to new projects, the events of 
September 11, 2001, caused the final meeting of national grantees to be delayed, and, 
while the evaluators had been focused on the Foundation and the DI grantees as their 
learning audience, the Foundation needed to tell the DI story to a public audience toward 
the end of the Initiative.  In addition, from the evaluators‘ perspective, the evaluation lost 
its internal advocate within the Foundation when Ricardo Millett left in April 2001.  For 
all of these reasons, the Foundation did not ask the evaluators to produce the type of final 
report typical for projects of the magnitude of the DI – a document bringing together 
findings and lessons on implementation, impact findings, and reflection and interpretation 
of the contribution of the Initiative in the policy context of the time. 
 
The Foundation made the decision to produce in book form its own version of the 
DI story for the public audience.  According to Alice Warner, 
 
The book was seen as a final summary of ―what has been learned‖ in the 
Devolution Initiative.  We found that we had done a lot of work (including the 
evaluation) on process, and yet the development and dissemination of a massive 
amount of information (I think between 2000-3000 reports, published documents, 
etc.) was produced or co-produced by various grantees with research on content.  
Two major pieces summarized the learning – the topic issues papers (an amazing 
collaborative writing process across organizations with dissimilar topic agendas) 
and the book. 
 
The topic issues papers referred to by Warner were published as appendices to ―the 
book,‖ Building Bridges Between Policy and People: Devolution in Practice.  Warner 
further reported a large mailing of the book to policymakers, along with publicity by 
grantees; it is also available, chapter by chapter, on the W. K. Kellogg Foundation 
website and was promoted on grantee websites and in various listservs. 
 
According to Karen Lake, the Building Bridges book was conceived ―to raise the 
visibility of the DI work, specifically the way it went about to address the issues.  It was 
not a replacement for evaluation, but was intended to draw upon some of the knowledge, 
experience, etc., gleaned through the process.‖  Further, Lake says, ―we wanted to be 
ready for the closing conference [of national grantees] so that we had something 
meaningful to distribute that documented the long journey from the grantees‘ 
perspective.‖ 
 
Ricardo Millett and the evaluators judged the book to be a substitute for an 
evaluation-oriented summing up.  On the other hand, it is not clear what an evaluation-
oriented summing up would have been able to deliver, according to Anne Petersen, who 
said, ―When evaluations aren‘t designed to deliver the bottom line, foundations don‘t 
have much choice.‖  About the DI evaluation she says, ―The outcome evaluation had 
some results, but it was largely anecdotal – which makes it difficult to know how to 
improve.‖ 
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 Alice Warner, who is widely known in the Foundation as the ―institutional 
memory‖ of the Devolution Initiative, comments on the attempt to characterize a DI 
bottom line in this way: 
 
So much of this retrospective suffers from the second hand quarterbacking – what 
could have/should have been done.  The field of evaluation and many of the 
methods used for policy-related research measurements were in very different 
places within their own cultures when we started.  More evaluators of true 
systems work (where everything is messy, interrelated, and everything moves) 
have moved thinking light years in the past few years.  Why this is key is that the 
sustainable part [of the DI] is the relationships among and within the coalitions 
and alliances.  Those are still working.  Some institutions [among the DI grantees] 
changed internal policy [and some individuals from those institutions] have taken 
these lessons into new institutions—and I can already see the application of 
lessons learned.  So, how does one measure relationship like that?  What are the 
stages?  And, where do you stop seeing the ripples?   
 
Epilogue: The Internal Evaluations 
 
 Toward the end of the Devolution Initiative, the W. K. Kellogg Foundation 
instituted a Planning, Programming, Management system for funded projects and 
initiatives that describes best practices and requirements for each stage of grantmaking 
activity, including close-out – a system that Alice Warner says modeled its initiative 
processes on the Devolution Initiative.  In this system, the Leveraging Impact and 
Learning (LIL) process is a requirement for closing initiatives that recognizes and 
formalizes the Foundation‘s desire to be a learning organization.  The Devolution 
Initiative was the first Foundation initiative to be studied in this LIL process to ―harvest‖ 
its lessons for future work.  The LIL study of the DI was the first of two internal 
evaluations. 
 
The idea of a Leveraging Impact and Learning study is to ―identify transferable 
concepts, strategies, and practices and to share insights with selected external audiences,‖ 
according to the authors of the ―Final Report: Leveraging Impact and Learning from the 
Devolution Initiative of the W.  K. Kellogg Foundation,‖ (March 25, 2004) by Shelley 
Stark and Mark Lelle, Foundation consultants.  Drawing from multiple sources, including 
the Harvard Family Research Project evaluation reports on the Initiative, this document 
provides succinct, definitive statements of DI results, including the following (which 
have been edited for length): 
 
 The DI partnerships between national and state grantees kept the pressure on the 
entire system for accountability to those in communities, which was helpful in 
maintaining supports when state and federal budget crises were forcing cuts in 
many programs. 
 The initiative produced data on implementation issues needed to create a 
reinforcing system of policy for social change. 
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 Both the policymakers and the general public who interacted with them changed 
behaviors in ways that supported social change reflective of experiences in their 
states. 
 State grantee lead organizations formed broad based coalitions and partnerships 
that included many people affected by the policy changes, but not at the table for 
policy decisions and all state grantees developed community leaders to carry on 
the policy change efforts for the future. 
 Information development for a range of audiences provided multiple places of 
entry into the policy system as well as promoted grantees thinking through 
positions for messages for maximum impact for the general public. 
 The requirement of work and inclusion of new voices in state efforts resulted in 
changes in governance structures of grantee organizations to include those being 
served as members of grantees‘ organizations. 
 
The Devolution Initiative LIL study was the first and so far only such Foundation 
review of an initiative and, for Teri Behrens, it raises questions about who should do the 
LIL studies and how these should be managed.  For example, one question is whether 
harvesting the lessons of an initiative should be the final responsibility of the program 
staff involved or whether this responsibility should be assigned to external people more 
removed from the experience.  In the case of the Devolution Initiative, a middle ground 
was chosen – one consultant who knew both the Foundation and the Initiative‘s 
beginnings, having been a Foundation employee at that time, and one who had worked on 
the Harvard Family Research Project evaluation. 
 
The Foundation judgment for the LIL study of the Devolution Initiative was that 
it would have taken too long and been very costly to bring in someone new to the 
initiative and to the Foundation to do the study.  On the other hand, in answering what 
did the Foundation learn about the process of devolution in communities, and what was 
learned about how to co-evolve evaluation and grantmaking in the context of a cross-
program initiative, Behrens believes that a meta-evaluation using a fresh look might have 
been more useful.  ―There was a small budget for this learning exercise, and one lesson is 
that we need to have enough to do this right, and spend the resources we do have on the 
right things,‖ she said.  (The LIL study for the Devolution Initiative was budgeted at 
$50,000, which included both extensive review of the many documents associated with 
the Initiative and interviews with all key players.) 
 
 A second internal evaluation of the DI was undertaken in 2002 in response to 
questions from the Foundation Board about whether there was ―evidence that there were 
differences between the states where the Foundation‘s Devolution Initiative was active 
and states where the Foundation did not conduct the Initiative.‖20  This evaluation 
concluded that: 
 
 Specific policies changed [in the DI states] to better serve people transitioning 
from welfare to work [compared to the non-DI states]; 
                                               
20  This is the language of a ―Program Note‖ in the materials for a December 2003 meeting of Foundation 
Trustees.  The Program Note introduces the report resulting from the internal evaluation, which was 
entitled ―Making a Difference in Devolution Initiative States: A Comparative Review.‖ 
  28 
 More people [in the DI states], especially those most directly affected, were 
significantly involved in devolution-related policy changes; and 
 Grantee organizations themselves changed to better serve their constituents [in the 
DI states]. 
 
This study involved an analysis of data on key indicators of health coverage and 
the use of TANF funds for child care in the DI states and five comparison states as well 
as a survey of 23 state policymakers in both sets of states administered by the Center for 




Persons Interviewed for the Case 
 
 
C. Patrick Babcock, former WKKF Director of Policy and DI Co-Chair 
 
Teresa Behrens, WKKF Director of Evaluation 
 
Julia Coffman, Harvard Family Research Project 
 
Karen Lake, WKKF Director of Communications and Marketing 
 
Mark Lelle, former WKKF Evaluation Manager and consultant to WKKF 
 
Daniella Levine, Communication Health Action Information Network 
(Human Services Coalition of Dade County, Florida) 
 
Ricardo Millett, former WKKF Director of Evaluation 
 
Dan E. Moore, WKKF Vice President for Program and DI Co-Chair 
 
Anne Petersen, WKKF Senior Vice President 
 
William Richardson, WKKF President 
 
Barbara Sabol, WKKF Program Director, Health 
 
Miguel Satut, WKKF Program Director, Youth and Education 
 
Henrie Treadwell, former WKKF Program Director, Health 
 
Alice Warner, WKKF Program Analyst 
 
Heather Weiss, Director, Harvard Family Research Project 
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Diane Smith, WKKF Program Assistant, provided invaluable assistance in gathering the 
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Learning Meetings Reports/Briefs 
1997 December Expectations, Implications, and Early Achievements 
1998 June Partnerships, Dissemination, and Capacity Building 
1998 October  1998 Learning Report and Executive Summary 
1998 November   
(no meeting) 
Community Foundation Brief: Strengthening Prospects for 
Sustainability of State and Community Mobilization Efforts 
1999 February 
DI Evaluation Key Accomplishments and Future challenges 
Special Brief on State Rollouts 
1999 June Learning Meeting Memo 
1999 November 
Learning Meeting Brief 
Pathways Diagram 
2000 March 
Overall Devolution Key Accomplishments 1997-2000 
State Mobilization Reports 1999-2000 (5 reports) 
2000 June 
Understanding Devolution Through Ethnic Media  
Citizen Research: Unpacking Pathway 3 
Scholar Practitioner Program Brief 
2000 August 
(Detroit meeting) 
Memo on community mobilization framework 
2000 October  The Devolution Initiative: State Views on Sustainability 
2000 December 
2000 Year-End Wrap-Up 
State Logic Models 
2001 January 
Five DI Lessons Linked to Sustainability  
DI Lessons Applied to the 5 States 
Memo on Tracking TANF Reauthorization 
2001 March 
DI Cross-State Media Strategies  
DI State-Specific Media Strategies (5 reports) 
2001 June Media Research Findings in Brief: 1999-2000 
2001 August  
2001 State Policy Advocacy Results: Cross-State Summary 
State 2001 State Policy Advocacy (5 reports) 
2001 October  
(no meeting) 
Scholar Practitioner Program Year 2 Evaluation (Revised) 
2002 February 
Learning Report 1997-2001 Evaluation Findings 
Pathway 1 (1997-2001) Findings and Implications 
Pathway 2 (1997-2001) Findings and Implications 
Pathway 3 (1997-2001) Findings and Implications 
2002 June 
―Post‖ Devolution Initiative Readings on Sustainability, TANF  
Reauthorization and State Policy  
Developing Community-Based Researchers (SPP) 
2002 September Scholar Practitioner Program Year 3 Evaluation Brief 


















DI Sustainability: Cross-State Findings 
State Sustaining Devolution Initiative Work and Gains (5 reports) 
Ten Questions about Investments in Citizen Engagement 
Helped to catalyze a 
sustainability conversation early 
on 
Began reporting on five states 
separately 
Examples of special topic 
evaluation reports 
Introduced pathways framing 
Reporting on policy-related 
outcomes 
Final reports on full DI 
Reports on sustainability 
specifically for State PDs 
Informed conversations on state 
mobilization 
Clarified Pathway 2/3 
distinctions 
Post-Initiative follow up on 
sustainability and other topics 
Appendix B 
Evaluation Learning Meetings and Briefs 
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Appendix C 
Devolution Initiative Evaluation Methods 
 
Method and Source Data Amount & Time Data Type & Analyses 
National Grantee Document 
Review 
129 in 1997 
325 in 1998 
311 in 1999 
456 in 2000 
Quantitative Content Analyses 
National Grantee Web Site Review 19 Web sites in 2000 and 2001 
Quantitative and Qualitative Content 
Analyses 
National Grantee Questionnaires 
and Interviews 
9 in 1998, 11 in 1999, 15 in 1999, 16 in 
2000, 17 in 2001 
Quantitative Statistics; Qualitative 
Content Analysis  
State Grantee Questionnaire, 
Interviews, Written, and Electronic 
Communication 
All 10 state grantees twice each year and 
across the five states in 1999, 2000, and 
2001  
Quantitative Statistics; Qualitative 
Content Analysis 
Grantee Staff Interviews 15 field staff and organizers (2000) Qualitative Content Analysis  
Community-Based Partner 
Interviews and Questionnaires 
32 community-based partners (2000) 
Quantitative Statistics; Qualitative 
Content Analysis 
Coalition Member Survey 203 coalition members (2001) Quantitative Statistics 
Scholar Practitioner Interviews 
Two rounds of formal interviews with SP 
mentors from 1999-2001; participant 
observation at 3 annual conferences; 
informal communication 
Qualitative Content Analysis  
State Site Visits and Event 
Observation with Structured 
Protocol 
~ 35 across five states in 1999-2001 
(includes site visits, observation at events, 
cross-initiative meetings) 
Qualitative Content Analysis 
Policymaker Questionnaires and 
Interviews (legislators and 
administrators) 
25 in 1998-1999 
51 in 1999-2000 
28 (interviews) in 2001 
Quantitative Statistics; Qualitative 
Content Analysis 
Policy Tracking 
Policy alerts and electronic legislative 
tracking 1999 – 2001 
Qualitative Content Analyses 
New Voice Interviews 15 in 2001 Qualitative Content Analyses 
Participant Observation in WKKF 
Meetings and Conference Calls 
>150 from 1997 – 2001 (includes Core 
Team, networking, disseminator, consultant, 
state, cross-initiative) 
Quantitative Descriptive Statistics; 
Qualitative Analysis 
Descriptive Scan (memos, reports, 
email) 
Series over 1997 – 2001 Qualitative Content Analysis 
Media Tracking 
2,391 articles about health care and welfare 
policy issues. From 29 electronic and print 
sources 
Quantitative and Qualitative Content 
Analysis 
Citizen Research 
10 Rochester Meetings; 10 Middletown 
Meetings 1999-2001 
Quantitative Statistics; Analysis of 
Audio Tapes; Debriefing 
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Project-level Evaluation (including 
TA on meetings) 

























































Case Teaching Questions 
 
 The purpose of a teaching case, such as the one about the Kellogg Foundation‘s 
Devolution Initiative  presented here, is to raise issues for discussion that are typically 
met in situations of uncertainty and complexity, where uncertainty and complexity may 
be present in the tasks, the organizations, the methods and technologies, the wider 
environment, or all of these realms.  To facilitate and stimulate discussion, teaching cases 
are constructed to provide their audience some basic facts about the situation, a narrative 
of events, and the perspectives of multiple participants in the events -- without 
conclusions or judgments. 
 
Teaching cases are taught through the use of questions to uncover the views of 
participants in a case teaching session about the issues the case is intended to open up.  
The case teacher begins the session questioning participants about the basic facts of the 
case as presented in the case document in order to establish a common understanding – 
what is the situation, who are the players, what is the task, what is the past experience of 
the organization with similar tasks, what is the policy environment, what is the state-of-
the-art, what is the evaluation design, etc.?  Then, the case teacher turns to questions for 
which there is no correct answer.  The following questions are offered to assist teachers 
of this case. 
 
1. What was the larger context for ―devolution‖? What was going on at this time in 
politics, government, and society that led to Devolution? 
2. How did the Foundation‘s mission lead to the Devolution Initiative?  What 
rationale emerged to connect this Initiative to the Foundation‘s mission?  In what 
ways was this a departure for the Foundation?  How did this change occur? And 
how did this change affect the conceptualization of the evaluation? 
3. How did the ―Evaluation Premises‖ paper affect the evaluation framework? 
 Discuss these premises.  In the larger field of evaluation, where do these premises 
position the W.K.Kellogg Foundation‘s approach to evaluation?  What values are 
embedded in the premises? 
4. How did the logic model change over time?  What led to these changes?  What 
was their importance? 
5. How was the evaluation managed by the Foundation?  What were the effects of 
this management approach?  What are alternative ways of managing an 
evaluation? 
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6. How were issues of attribution handled in the design?  How did concern about 
attribution change over time?  Why? 
7. What were the evaluation‘s ―multi-dimensional set of services to the 
Foundation‖?   What tensions are manifest between these various ―components‖ 
of the overall evaluation? 
8. Discuss the notion of an evaluation ―bottom line‖ as it emerged in the evaluation?  
Where does this metaphor come from?  What are alternative metaphors? 
9. How did ethnicity and race become an issue in the evaluation?  Discuss the issue 
of diversity in an evaluation context based on the case? 
1.10. What were the various roles played by the evaluators?  How did these 
roles change over time?  What tensions emerged between these various roles?  
What lessons do you take from these role examples? 
2.11.  Do you concur or not in Pat Babcock‘s observation that, if he were going 
to do the Devolution Initiative again, he would bring in different evaluators for 
different stages of the project?  Why? 
3.12. From the evaluators‘ perspective, what are the advantages and 
disadvantages of having an internal audience or an external audience or both?  
From the Foundation‘s perspective, what are the advantages and disadvantages? 
4.13. Why was there no overall, ―summing up‖ final report from the evaluators?  
What were the results of this inside and outside the Foundation? 
5.14. What does it take – from both evaluators and stakeholders – to ensure that 
learning takes place?  What ingredients and commitments are necessary to ensure 
an atmosphere conducive to learning?  What forms and formats did evaluation 
reporting take in the DI case and how did these contribute (or not) to learning? 
6.15. How can interest and engagement in evaluation be sustained throughout an 
initiative – especially over time as players change and the Foundation adopts new 
priorities?  Are there ways in which the evaluators and the Foundation could have 
helped to sustain interest and engagement longer in the Devolution Initiative? 
